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This paper compares the transactions costs in two economies, one conventional, the other Islamic.  The 
conventional economy is characterized by borrowing to finance some current purchases, while the Islamic 
economy disallows interest-based lending and operates on the basis of universal banking that mixes 
commerce and commercial and investment banking.  To finance current purchases, it provides customers 
with credit purchase agreements, which entail that the bank buy the commodities and assets from suppliers 
and resell them on credit to customers satisfying conditions of creditworthiness similar to those that 
conventional banks require for borrowers.  The paper uses simple calculations to compare transactions costs 
in both economies.  It argues that under competitive competition, credit purchase arrangements occasion 
lower transactions costs than borrow-and-purchase arrangements in the conventional economy.  The most 
important implication is that a policy that lifts entry barriers in the Islamic banking market and allows banks 
to combine commerce with banking activities contributes to social welfare.  The paper concludes with 
suggestions for further points of research. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTIONi 
 
This paper compares the transactions costs in two economies, one conventional and another Islamic.  The 
conventional economy is characterized by borrowing as a means of financing some of the current purchases.  The 
Islamic economy does not allow interest-based lending.ii  Its banking system operates on the basis of universal 
banking that mixes commerce, commercial and investment banking together.  It provides customers with an 
alternative means to finance current purchases, namely credit purchase arrangements.  Such arrangements entail that 
the bank purchases the commodities and assets from their respective suppliers and resells them on credit to 
customers satisfying conditions of credit worthiness similar to those required by conventional banks for borrowers. 
The paper uses simple calculations to compare the transactions costs in both economies.  It argues that 
under competitive competition, credit purchase arrangements would carry less transactions costs than borrow and 
purchase arrangements in the conventional economy.  The most important implication is that a policy that lifts entry 
barriers in the Islamic banking market and allows banks to combine commerce with banking activities would 
contribute to social welfare.  The paper concludes with suggestions for further points of research. 
 
II.  REAL TRANSACTIONS 
 
Real transactions are defined as the purchase of real commodities and assets against spot or future cash 
payment. 
 
A.  Spot Purchases of Commodities and Assets 
Economic agents would exchange money directly for goods, services, and assets.  Such transactions can be 
termed real transactions, type I.  Their total value is a function of output (the available flow of goods and services 
, prices as well as transactions costs.iii 
A priori, the conduct of the above transactions will cost some resources.  The cost per transaction in the ith 
commodity is defined as and in the ith asset as .  The total cost of real spot transactions can be defined as 
the sum of spot transactions in goods and services plus the cost of spot transactions in assets .  This 
in turn can be written as: , where N is the number of either commodities (goods and services) or 
assets, whichever is largest. 
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Total transactions of type I would be equal to the value of spot transactions in commodities  plus the 
value of spot transactions in assets , i.e., .  Given that the value of transactions in the ith 
commodity is equal to its price,  multiplied by its quantity, ,iv and the value of transactions in the ith real asset 
is equal to its price  multiplied by its quantity , .  Similarly, the total value of 
transactions in commodities can be expressed as a function of commodity current prices , their expected 
prices , total income  as well as their transactions costs . 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………(1) 
Similarly, the total value of transactions in assets  can be expressed as a function of asset current prices 
, their expected prices , their current rates of return , their expected rates of return 
, total income  as well as their transactions costs . 
…………………………………………………………………….(2) 
We can therefore write the total value of real transactions type I as a function of current and expected 
commodity as well as asset prices, current and expected rates of return on assets as well as transactions costs. 
………………………………………………………………… (3) 
An increase in the flow of goods and services would lead to greater volume of this type of transactions.  
Lower prices imply higher quantities demanded and more purchases, while higher prices would mean lower 
quantities demanded and more sales.  In both cases, changes in prices, whether up or down would lead to more 
transactions.v  Similarly, changes in asset rates of return would lead to more transactions.  In addition, higher 
transactions costs imply a smaller volume of transactions. 
 
B.  Purchase of Commodities and Assets on Credit 
In all transactions, it is possible to postpone either side of the deal: the payment of the price or the delivery 
of commodities.  The postponement of payment is associated with buying on credit.  The postponement of delivery 
of goods, services, and real assets against spot payment would be equivalent of purchasing a real asset promising 
their future delivery.  This has been dealt with in the above category. 
 
C.  Combining Commerce with Banking 
Credit finance can be offered either directly by suppliers or indirectly through banks.  Suppliers would offer 
their customers opportunities to purchase on credit, provided they fulfill certain criteria regarding creditworthiness.  
In an Islamic banking environment, the same suppliers would have an incentive to offer banks standing 
arrangements to buy their commodities and assets for cash, most surely at a discount.vi  Obviously, the sale contracts 
between suppliers and banks would carry less transactions costs than the corresponding multiplicity of contracts 
with ordinary customers.  In all cases, banks would be doing repetitive purchases, presumably to satisfy customers 
demands.  Repetition would induce banks to make standing arrangements that would reduce transactions costs 
immensely.  In addition, when selling to banks on credit, suppliers would incur lower transactions costs, as bank 
creditworthiness is cheaper to ascertain than that of an individual. 
In addition, banks as information specialists are capable of ascertaining individuals’ creditworthiness more 
cheaply than suppliers can.  They can also take advantage of quantity discounts when buying in bulk, as well as 
standing arrangements in place of repetitive contracting.  This would enable banks to reduce their transactions costs 
of buying and then selling on credit, below that of purchasing on credit directly from suppliers.vii  In addition, 
barring barriers to entry, distributors would also compete with banks in buying in bulk and selling to the public at a 
discount.  Banks would therefore be forced through competition to reduce their transactions costs further. 
Accordingly, we can claim that the transactions costs of credit purchase through banks should generally be 
less than that through suppliers, although the former involves two contracts and the latter involves one.  The former 
would ultimately dominate the latter in an Islamic banking environment.viii 
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The above logic implies that the transactions costs of CP directly from suppliers  should be higher 
than that of the corresponding purchases from banks , i.e., 
………………………………………………………………………………………………(4) 
 
D.  Transactions Costs of Credit Purchase 
When people buy on credit, they would be receiving their purchases while providing monetary assets 
(promises to pay fixed sums of money at certain future times) in return.  Providers of commodities and real assets on 
credit will require a premium over and above their spot prices, called markup.ix  It will depend on the demand for 
purchase and supply for sale of the same commodity or asset on credit as well as the repayment time schedule.  
Presumably, markups would also be different for different commodities.x  The total value of such transactions 
is equal to the sum of transactions of credit purchase of both goods and services,  and of assets, .  Both 
components depend on income, commodity and asset CP prices, respectively, 
markups on commodities and assets,  as well as transactions costs, .  
Naturally, we can expect transactions costs for the same commodity to be higher for future than spot transactions, i. 
e., . 
We can call this type of transactions real transactions type II.  Their total value would be defined as: 
 
Total real transactions type II can therefore be determined through the following function, which is similar 
to (3) above. 
………………………………………………………(5) 
Transactions would continue to react in the same manner to income, prices, and transactions costs.  In 
addition, higher markup leads to lower level of transactions. 
 
E.  Real Transactions and Total Output 
We can draw the following implications from (3) and (5): 
 
1. At times of changing price and rate of return expectations, traders would attempt to buy (sell) more of the 
goods whose prices are expected to rise (fall).  The volume of transactions would therefore increase, 
requiring, either higher velocity or faster monetary growth.  If both velocity and monetary growth stayed 
the same, the price level would tend, ceteris paribus, to decline.  Most probably, the market would provide 
internal mechanisms to increase velocity in the face of higher transactions, as more transactions would 
mean a higher rate of turnover of money, and goods.  We can therefore claim that velocity would be a 
function of price expectations as well as the volume of transactions.xi 
2. Real transactions can be viewed as reactions to changes in demands and supplies of commodities and 
assets, prompted by price as well as rate-of-return expectations.  They would ultimately produce a new set 
of prices and rates of return that would directly influence output plans.  One could envision the existence of 
reaction functions operating between changes in demands and supplies, changes in transactions, and finally 
changes in output plans.  There would therefore be a relationship between transactions on the one hand and 
output of goods, services, and assets on the other through those reaction functions.  Such relationship could 
emanate from two sources. 
2. First, as commodities and assets are exchanged, additional values are created.  This is because the exchange 
of goods and services from one individual to another would improve the allocation of resources and 
produce extra efficiency, which would benefit all traders in different proportions.  Extra efficiency can be 
translated into extra output.  This implies that there is a positive relationship between real transactions and 
output, such that . 
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3. Second, transactions in commodities and assets whose demand has declined (increased) relative to their 
supplies would be associated with decreasing (increasing) prices, which would send a signal to producers to 
decrease (increase) output.  The greater the volume of those transactions, the stronger the intensity of such 
signals, and the faster resources are reallocated from decreasing- to increasing-demand commodities.  
Faster adjustment would produce efficiency gains in terms of better production plans and less inventories.  
This can also be translated into higher output, so that .xii 
 
III.  NOMINAL TRANSACTIONS 
 
A.  Spot Money against Monetary Assets 
The act of borrowing can be viewed as a purchase of monetary assets, i.e., promises of future delivery of 
fixed sums of money.  Here we assume that the payment of the current value of the monetary asset is done 
immediately.xiii 
Such transactions could be termed nominal transactions.  Their total value  is a function of 
the current and expected rates of interest as well as their transactions costs. 
……………………………………………………………………………………(6) 
As the current rate of interest rises, the amount of borrowing and consequently, , declines.  When the 
expected future rate of interest rises, current borrowing as well as  increases, and vise versa. 
 
B.  Comparing the Transactions Costs of Credit and Cash Purchases 
1. We notice that each real transaction on credit can be substituted for by two transactions.  If one wants to 
buy a commodity on credit, he can make one real transaction for a direct CP.  His transactions costs would 
be equal to .xiv  To the whole society, the transactions costs of that exchange is equal to , 
where the first term refers to the cost of the CP contract and the second refers to the cost of acquiring the 
commodity by the bank from its supplier.  Alternatively, he can borrow through selling a nominal asset 
incurring transactions costs equal to .  Then he uses the proceeds to make another real transaction to 
purchase the desired commodity for cash, incurring transactions costs equal to  .xv 
2. We turn now to compare the transactions costs of a CP contract, , with that of selling a bond 
(borrowing), .  The underlying elements of ascertaining the creditworthiness of the agent who is buying 
on credit in the first case and borrowing in the second are the same.  However, we can refer to some 
reasons that would bring the transactions costs of credit purchase below that of borrowing. 
• In the case of purchase of real assets and other durables on credit, the commodity sold would serve as 
collateral subject to repossessing by the seller.  In the case of lending, suitable collateral has to be 
identified separately.  Conceivably, that would reduce the transaction costs involved in buying assets 
and durables on credit below the corresponding costs of borrowing. 
• We can assume that transactions costs would depend on the ability to repay a loan, which in turn 
would depend, among other things, on what the borrower does with it.  The more such behavior is 
predictable, the more predictable becomes the ability to repay.  In the case of CP, the debtor is certain 
to use the loan toward the acquisition of the commodity or asset in question.  Meanwhile, in case of 
borrowing, there is no way of telling for certain how the loan would be spent.  The ability to repay 
would therefore be more predictable in the case of credit finance, which would imply lower 
transactions costs. 
• Banks in an Islamic economic system operate on the bases of universal banking, i.e., they can take 
equity and provide credit finance simultaneously to the same enterprise.  The practice of universal 
banking in a world of asymmetric information is known to reduce the cost of monitoring borrowers 
(Aoki 1994, Boyd; 1998 Diamond, 1998).  This means that the transactions costs of credit finance 
provided by banks to enterprises in which they take stock would be lower with universal rather than 
commercial banking.  This in turn would imply lower transactions costs of providing credit purchase to 
enterprises in which banks have stakes. 
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3. We can therefore conclude that in a world of Islamic banking, where universal banking is practiced, and 
especially in the case of financing the purchase of assets and durables, the transactions costs of CP tend to 
be lower than that of borrowing, namely .xvi 
4. So far, we have compared the transactions costs of a CP contract with that of making a loan of equal value.  
Adding the transactions costs of using the loan proceeds to make a cash purchase to the transactions costs 
of borrowing, and that of purchasing the commodity directly from the supplier, and noting (4) above, we 
obtain: 
………………………………………………………………………………………(7) 
This implies that under competitive conditions, purchase on credit, CP is more efficient than borrowing 
followed by cash purchase of the same commodities, BAP. 
 
C.  Nominal Transactions and Real Output 
We can look into how nominal transactions affect output from several angles. 
 
1. At the outset, nominal transactions provide liquidity to those who sell nominal assets, which they could use 
to carry out real transactions type I.  To the extent that this could not be done through credit purchases, 
nominal transactions could influence real output through stimulating real transactions type I.  As we have 
seen above, people will find it cheaper to carry out credit purchases in one step rather than to do it in two 
steps: borrowing and then purchasing, especially if banks were allowed to sell on credit. 
2. We can then ask why people would resort to borrowing to finance their purchases when credit purchase 
arrangements are available, despite the higher transactions costs of the former.  One reason would be 
incomplete information.  The calculus of transactions costs may not be as simple and straightforward to 
many agents.  However, this would not continue in the long run, as traders would gradually gain more 
information through exchange.  A more important source would be weaker competition in the CP markets 
relative to the borrowing market, thereby raising the rate of markup above the rate of interest sufficiently to 
counteract any savings in transactions costs.xvii  In either case, there is a deadweight loss at the 
macroeconomic level.  Such deadweight loss can be avoided by credit purchase. 
 
IV.  COMPARING ECONOMIES WITH AND WITHOUT BORROWING 
 
Let us assume two economies of equal resources, one conventional and another Islamic.  The aggregate 
output of each can be divided between consumption, investment, and transactions costs according to the following 
identity: 
………………………………………………………………………………… (8) 
The aggregate transactions costs in a conventional economy, with no CP arrangements through banks, 
would be composed of the cost of borrowing (selling monetary assets), the cost of spot purchase of commodities: 
…………………………………………………………………………………… (9) 
In an economy with CP arrangements through the banking system, like the Islamic economy, aggregate 
transactions costs would be composed of the cost of credit purchase through banks and the cost of cash purchase of 
commodities by banks from suppliers: 
…………………………………………………………………………………. (10) 
As shown in (7) above, the total of CP and cash purchase transactions costs (by banks) in (10) would be 
less that the corresponding total of borrowing and cash purchase transactions costs (by individuals) in (9).  This 
implies that 
……………………………………………………………………………… (11) 
We can therefore conclude under the above assumptions, that economies with CP arrangements through 
banks would have relatively more resources available for consumption and investment. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The main conclusion of the above analysis is that, under competitive conditions, purchase on credit costs 
less than borrowing to finance spot purchases.  Some observed market behavior confirms that result.  Suppliers of 
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durable goods sometimes join banks to offer financing packages to their customers, which combine borrowing and 
spot purchase in one deal, mimicking credit purchase arrangements. 
Islamic banks usually offer credit purchase deals to their customers.  In most countries conventional banks 
are not allowed to use similar modes of finance, while entry to the Islamic banking market is severely restricted.  
Some Islamic banks in such countries have the opportunity to take advantage of such monopolistic edge by charging 
markups, which would be higher than market rates of interest, presumably by the expected savings in transactions 
costs. 
We can therefore conclude that a policy that lifts entry barriers facing Islamic banks and allows 
conventional banks to combine commerce with banking activities contributes to social welfare. 
 
VI.  FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Relaxing some of the assumptions, especially competition in either the commodity or credit markets would 
conceivably produce different results.  The dynamic comparison of both Islamic and conventional economies would 
also be interesting.  If both started with the same resources, would they end up with the same size?  The Islamic 
economy has a fragmented credit market, as credit must be associated with the purchase of some commodity.  
Conventional economies have integrated credit markets.  The implications of this on efficiency and stability need to 
be further explored.  Debt created through purchase on credit is unsalable against money, i.e., it is not marketable in 
the usual economic sense.  However, under some institutional arrangements, it can be swapped against real assets.  
The effect of such swapping on debt liquidity as well as social welfare requires investigation.  In addition, perhaps 
alternative institutional arrangement for debt swapping could be looked into.  In any case, we can say that debt in an 
Islamic economy is of limited marketability. 
A further complication relates to the pattern of behavior toward liquidity in economies with debt of limited 
marketability.  In such economies, money defined broadly would contain a shorter list of quasi-monetary assets.  In 
addition, credit purchase should have satisfied some “monetary needs” the resulting debt would satisfy some more, 
albeit within a limited scope.  Analysis of the financial market in such economy would need to consider the full 
menu of financial assets to see to what extent people who wish to maintain a certain degree of liquidity can do so. 
Finally, we have so far assumed that borrowing would be made exclusively for the purchase of 
commodities and real assets.  It is possible though that people would borrow to finance the purchase of nominal 
assets.  This would be mainly for speculative purposes.  Here we need to know how such transactions would affect 
output on the one hand and whether it would have some bearing on economic stability. 
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i The author is indebted to M. Elgari, M.N. Siddiqi, and his colleagues at the Islamic Research and Training 
Institute who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts.  Any mistakes and shortcomings remain the sole 
responsibility of the author. 
ii Lending money in an Islamic economy is considered to be a philanthropic act, through which someone 
provides temporary liquidity to one who is temporarily short of liquidity and who presumably wishes to fulfill some 
basic needs.  In such cases, loans are forwarded interest-free.  Obviously, such activity would occur only on a limited 
scale and within special circles, e.g., relatives, friends, and neighbors, in whose cases creditworthiness can easily be 
ascertained and debt collection can be done at low costs.  The author has pointed out elsewhere that interest-free 
lending could take place on a large scale with proper institutional arrangements (Al Jarhi, 1983).  Debt resulting from 
CP can be exchanged for cash and monetary assets only at face value.  It can be swapped against real commodities and 
assets.  This is tantamount to saying that debt has rather limited appeal.  This would represent an implicit restraint on 
credit finance. 
iii Transaction costs are the costs associated with transacting trades.  They include: commissions, bid-ask 
spreads, impact costs associated with carrying out large transactions off the market, and administrative costs (which 
include the costs of confirming, documenting, reconciling, and clearing trades).  For further information, see 
http://www.contingencyanalysis.com. 
iv The question arises when several transactions, each entailing a different price, are made in the same 
commodity.  The value of transactions in such a commodity would be equal to the sum of transactions values (price 
times quantity) at each price.  For simplicity, we can assume that either the exchange time horizon allows for only one 
transaction in each commodity, or the value of transactions in each commodity implies already summing over each 
transaction at each price. 
v As long as demand is not perfectly inelastic, there will be more transactions in reaction to changes in prices.  
The size of the demand elasticity would determine the quantities purchased but would not inhibit reaction to changes in 
price. 
vi Suppliers can offer banks facilities to provide customers with loans to finance their purchases.  However, 
such transactions would revert to lending then purchasing. 
vii There are other advantages of combining banking and commerce (Haubrich and Santos, 1999). 
viii Therefore, as will be seen later, we can venture to say that it would be more efficient in a conventional 
banking environment to allow banks to directly finance credit purchases. 
ix The commonly known justifications for that premium include time preference and alternative uses of the 
sold commodities and assets in the production process.  The markup on the spot price of each good and service, 
, and each asset, , is equal to the difference between the 
credit-purchase price and the cash price of each, divided by the latter price. 
x It is also possible that markups on the credit sale of any particular commodity would be different for 
different buyers, depending on the risk element associated with each. 
xi Obviously, this would have implications regarding the constancy of velocity and the stability of the demand 
function for money. 
xii In a growing economy, an increase in transactions would lead to more signals to increase than to decrease 
output, as the decline in the demand for some commodities and assets would be more than offset by the increase in the 
demand for others. 
xiii We can perceive of cases where some agents would borrow to buy monetary assets, i.e., exchanging 
monetary assets for monetary assets.  We are excluding such possibilities. 
xiv He would pay a markup over the spot price equal to , his total cost of making the exchange, over and 
above the current purchase value; the total is equal to . 
xv His total cost, over and above the purchase value for that exchange, is equal to . 
xvi Comparing the interest payment on borrowing, , in the case of BAP, with the markup on CP, 
, would be more complicated.  The rate of interest is charged for delivering present money in return for future 
money.  Meanwhile, markups are charged for delivering commodities and assets, also in return for future money.  Both 
interest rates and markups would vary with loan maturities as well as with the creditworthiness of borrowers.  Markups 
may also vary with commodities and assets. 
Under competition, both elements should be equivalent.  However, in general, imperfections are more 
prevalent in credit than in commodity markets, especially as credit markets are usually more subject to regulation.  
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Matters are complicated by the fact that while the rate of interest reflects the rate of time preference on money, 
markups would reflect the rate of time preference on commodities.  Their comparison would be rather difficult. 
xvii This would be particularly common in countries that restrict the establishment of Islamic banks, thereby 
giving monopolistic advantages to existing participants in the Islamic banking market. 
